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“A company has the legal capacity and powers of an individual both in and outside this 
jurisdiction.” Australian Corporation Act 2001, Section 124. 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates the legal and commercial consequences of companies being 
considered as both an entity and a person in law – hence the notion of ‘cyborg’ in its 
title. It concentrates upon legal personhood and relates this particular feature to the 
issue of corporate citizenship. In turn corporate citizenship provides a link to 
considering the political role of companies, since in claiming citizenship they are 
implicitly at least claiming a particular set of political rights consequent upon that 
status, and announcing a particular politically constrained context associated with 
their operational characteristics.  But what would be involved in granting companies 
full citizenship rights in the image of natural person citizenship? The paper explores 
this issue in connection to the differences between corporate social responsibility and 
an earlier idea of the socially responsible corporation that arose in the debate between 
Adolph Berle and Edwin Dodd in the 1930s, focussing on the notion of ‘enterprise 
entity analysis’ that was posed in that debate, and which has reappeared more 
recently. 
 
Key words: corporate citizenship, company law, corporate legal personality, limited 
liability, enterprise entity analysis, property rights 
 
Introduction 
 
I was once speaking to a corporate lawyer during a conference and asked him what a 
company was in law. He replied that strictly speaking a company was nothing more 
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than a bank account with rules about who had access to its resources. This, he 
suggested, was the ultimate nature of its ‘corporate legal personality’. This was an 
unexpected but intriguing answer, and I suspected not a fully accurate one. He went 
on to draw the well known distinction between limited liability and legal personality 
saying that these were often conflated in the case of companies but needed to be 
considered as separate aspects of the company form.  
 
In this paper I examine this double character of company legal constitution in the 
context of its implications for corporate citizenship. Subsequently, the idea of 
corporate citizenship is linked to its political implications: companies cannot claim to 
be citizens while avoiding the politically constrained consequences of this status for 
their organizational structure or operational characteristics. That such companies are 
subject to dictates of social responsibility is well know and recognized, but citizenship 
demands more than this it is argued. And here the article explores the contemporary 
position of the company as a political entity in relationship to the 1930s debate 
between Adolf Berle and Edwin Dodd about ‘enterprise analysis’ and the ‘socially 
responsible company’ (which is not the same as corporate social responsibility, as we 
shall see). This involves arguments about the reform of the limited liability status of 
companies. Finally, the current context for corporate citizenship and the political role 
of companies is discussed. 
 
Of course the history of legal personality as afforded to limited liability (L-L) 
companies is an interesting one, and a controversial one. It is controversial because, in 
the USA in particular, there is a strong objection to this. This has to do with the way it 
seems to have been ‘smuggled’ into being via a landmark judgement made in the case 
of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railway in 1886. In this case Supreme 
Court judge Chief Justice Waite ‘announced’ the principle as a prelude to the 
commencement  and judgement on the case, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution (guaranteeing equal protection before the law to all persons within 
a jurisdiction) applied to companies as well as to ‘natural persons’. Ever since there 
has been a dispute about both the appropriateness of this particular action by the judge 
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and whether the US Constitution and its Amendments can indeed be legitimately 
extended to apply to company activity (Cerri, nd).  Many continue to think not.(1)  In 
addition it was a landmark case in the UK courts that inaugurated the position of 
separate corporate personality (C-P) for British companies: Salomon v Salomon & Co. 
(1897). 
 
In this article I review the literature on L-L and C-P in the light of companies being 
considered as ‘citizens’. But –- as anyone with even the slightest familiarity with the 
literature of C-P will appreciate -- there is a long history to this and a vast literature. It 
is not the intention to go over all this literature yet again. Rather I concentrate upon 
pertinent aspects that have to do with the question of ‘corporate citizenship’. This will 
be selective, of course, and may not cover every point. 
 
 
Legal Personhood 
 
Although the article is mainly concerned with companies that have L-L status, it will 
be useful to preface these remarks with a short discussion of the general nature of 
legal personhood. The classic case of legal personhood applies to ‘natural persons’. 
But this term should not be taken to imply an unproblematic naturalness on behalf of 
humans. A ‘natural person’ is a legal category: defined as a cognate being perceptible 
through the senses, able to rationalize and make decisions, and having an identity that 
persist through time: and minors and those of impaired metal capacities, or criminals 
are often treated as special cases for various purposes (like voting). On the other hand 
there is the category or ‘artificial person’ or ‘virtual person’, which applies to 
corporate bodies of various kinds (though see the discussion below on this 
terminology). These display various features, but the basic characteristic is that the 
entity so constituted is considered a separate one from the human persons who either 
own it, manage it or otherwise work for it. It has the status of a legal entity in its own 
6 
 
right, which enables it to contract business as it sees fit (subject to the constraints of 
law and custom of course). In a moment I return to the kinds of persons companies 
can be considered to be -- which remains controversial -- and subsequently to the 
rights they can claim in law that are analogous to those of natural persons. 
 
The question of legal personhood is not confined to just natural persons or corporate 
bodies, however. There is a debate over extending some of these features to other 
inanimate entities or non-sentient beings. The classic examples are trees, involving a 
debate initiated by Christopher Stone’s (1972) suggestion that these be afforded the 
status of ‘standing’ (enabling a party to sue for damages in a court) so as to enable 
them to literally remain standing when under threat from logging companies for 
instance. ‘Friends of the trees’ would establish a form of legal guardianship over such 
trees under threat, and use the courts to seek protection for them.  
 
This inaugurated an ongoing debate about extending such legal rights to other animals 
and entities (e.g. Varner 1987, Solum 1992, Teubner 2006 – the great apes come 
immediately to mind) (2), and in seeking stakeholder status for such objects in respect 
to corporate governance (Starik 1995). In addition, robotic entities have also been the 
subject of such discussion (e.g. Solum 1992), and even completely artificial agents 
like search engines, shopping web-site operations, and data-bases (Allen & Widdison 
1996, Chopra & White 2004). Below I reflect on quite what all this might mean for 
the category and status of citizenship, which is one closely linked to the idea of 
‘personhood in law’. But just a quick comment now on the trees issue, which began 
this debate, and which serves to illustrate some wider concerns. The difficulty with 
affording the status of personhood or standing to these is where would it end? 
Supposing trees had this legal status, one tree could then in principle sue another tree 
if there were some conflict over access to the light, for instance. And why not extend 
the status to aphids? If they were then to attack the tree’s leaves presumably the tree 
could sue the aphids. The possibilities are endless, but this just demonstrates where all 
this loose ‘rights talk’ might take us. 
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Finally, single people can also be a legal corporate body. This arises in the case of 
‘the corporation sole’. In Anglo-American law this is a legal entity consisting of a 
single (‘sole’) incorporated office, occupied by a single (‘sole’) man or woman. This 
allows a corporation to pass vertically in time from one office holder to the next 
successor-in-office, giving the position legal continuity with each subsequent office 
holder having identical powers to his or her predecessor. Although this capacity is 
usually associated with religious offices (the head of the Church of England, The 
Archbishop of Canterbury, is such a corporation sole), it is not confined to this office 
alone. The British monarch, for instance, is not just a human person (indeed, she is not 
just a ‘natural person’ either; in as much that she claims divine lineage she is also a 
‘super-natural person’ of sorts) but has several ‘corporation soles’ which allow her to 
hold property in the name of the monarch in several different countries and 
jurisdictions (3). 
 
To sum up, broadly speaking to have legal personality implies that a body has an 
existence independently of its members, i.e. it does not terminate with the death of its 
founders; that it can sue and be sued in a court in its own name, with respect to 
contracts as well as to torts and crimes, even in relation to its members (I return to 
torts below); and finally, that it may own property in its own name. This latter point is 
very important in the context of the question of who or what ‘owns’ a L-L company. 
Conventional language vests ownership in the shareholders, but strictly speaking and 
in a legal sense this is not quite the case. In the next section I review the position of 
companies as legal persons in the context of this vexed question of who or what owns 
them. I do this as a first clarificatory move in anticipation that this will help in a 
further clarificatory move associated with the relationship between the personhood of 
companies and their role in claiming to be ‘citizens’. 
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Ownership and Legal Personhood 
 
In the long dispute over corporate personhood there have been three basic positions. 
These are neatly summed up by Iwai: 
 
“The corporate realists believe that the corporation is a fully-fledged 
organizational entity whose legal personality is no more than an external 
expression of its real personality in the society. The corporate nominalists, 
in opposition, assert that the corporation is a contractual association of 
individual shareholders whose legal personality is no more than an 
abbreviated way of writing their names together for legal transactions. And 
both claim to have superseded the ‘fiction theory,’ the traditional doctrine 
since the time of Pope Innocent IV, which maintained a position one might 
well think tortuous: that the corporation is a separate and distinct social 
entity, but that its legal personality is a mere fiction conceded by the state 
or created by law.” (Iwai 1999, p.584; italics added) 
 
According to Iwai, Maitland’s ‘Introduction’ to Otto Gierke (1900) established the 
forerunner to the realist position: that on the basis of ‘real’ conditions on the ground 
and found in practice corporations are entities absolutely equivalent to natural persons 
(see also Laski 1916). Corporations are ‘organic’ bodies that display all the 
characteristics of natural persons (Gierke 1900). This is sometimes known as the 
natural entity theory of the corporation: that the corporation is neither a legal fiction 
created by the state, nor a contract among individuals, but a natural person whose 
existence is prior to law. In fact, the contemporary realist position distances itself 
from Gierke’s formulations since its wants to found the ‘realistic’ corporation in law. 
Thus it distances itself from the ‘physico-spiritual unity’ conception of the corporate 
entity as an organization somehow endowed with a mysterious organicist 
metaphysical will of its own (Iwai 1999, p.616; Note 1982). As we will see in a 
moment the contemporary realist position views corporate autonomy as a 
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consequence of interactions between human beings, both inside and outside the entity, 
but who address their activities in the name of the corporation itself in the first 
instance, rather than in terms of their own personal proclivities, inclinations or 
intentions. 
 
On the other hand there is the nominalist position. Although this has a long tradition 
in the economics literature, it is modern agency theory and particularly the idea of the 
corporation as nothing more than a ‘nexus of contracts’ that has given it added 
impetus (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Williamson 1990). As a nexus of contracts the 
firm can be considered to be something other than the aggregation of its constituent 
parts. From this perspective, however, ‘ownership’ (in the form of possession) is 
rejected as an appropriate category in respect to business firms; contracts cannot be 
owned as possessions in the same manner as asset can (though see below). Instead, 
shareholders are considered as ‘principals’; able to direct their ‘agents’, the managers 
and directors. But this does not go quite far enough since the modern corporation is 
more than this: it is a fully-fledged subject of property ownership in its own right so it 
too can make contracts of its own and enter into litigation: it acts beyond what can be 
accommodated simply by an ex-ante contractual specification (see also Parkinson 
1993, chapter 6, who nevertheless supports a strict ownership model of the 
corporation criticized in a moment). 
 
Finally, there is the ‘fiction theory’ often first attributed to German romantic F.C. von 
Savigny (see Rattigan 1884; Maitland’s ‘Introduction’ to Gierke 1900; Rückert 2006). 
In this case the corporation is considered an artificial entity admitted as a subject in 
law by means of a ‘pure fiction’ sanctioned by the State. However, it is possible to 
interpret Savigny more subtly as affording legal relational status to corporations other 
than by State sanction, though it perhaps needs the recognition by the State ‘in the last 
instance’ so to speak (Iwai 1999, pp.602-03).  
 
The difficulty in judging between these approaches to specifying the appropriate 
relationship between personhood and ownership arises because the corporation 
recognized in law is both a ‘thing’ and a ‘person’ at the same time. It is a kind of 
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‘cyborg’: analogous to both human and machine. The definition of a cyborg employed 
here is not so much one that sees it as a cybernetic organism in the form of a network 
of communication and control, but as an entity that shares properties of both synthetic 
mechanical operationality (thingness) and properties of humanness (personhood). So 
this is not humanness in the form of a natural person but as an artificial person. 
Shareholders own ‘shares’ (and stockholders own ‘stocks’) but not the assets or 
property of the company as such, which are invested in the company itself: in a legal 
sense the company ‘owns’ itself (Ireland 1999, 2010). Thus we could say that it is 
subject to a double ownership relation: once by the shareholder who ‘own’ shares, and 
once by the corporation itself which owns the company assets. Shares (pieces of 
paper) give shareholders certain rights (or perhaps better put, afford them certain 
‘claims’, see below): they share in the surpluses generated by the company, they have 
voting rights in respect to the officers of the company and in terms of mergers and 
acquisitions, and they can sell (and buy) shares.  
 
In this respect -- within Anglo-American legal practice at least -- the shareholder is in 
a very similar legal position to any other creditor vis a vis the company as legal 
subject (nb. Dodd 1932); they are both its ‘claimants’ and have no direct proprietary 
entitlements in the companies assets or property as such. Their interests jointly 
represent potential liabilities from the point of view of the company (Hadden 1997). 
 
Similarly, although the managers may be (formally at least) elected or appointed by 
the shareholder, they are legally constrained to work in the best interests of the 
company in the first instance, not the shareholder: they have obligatory fiduciary 
duties. (4) Their role is to supervise the continuing organizational, financial and legal 
reproduction of the company – to maintain is as a ‘going concern’, to ‘keep the capital 
intact’, and so on. And as Brendan McSweey (2009) has drawn attention to, when 
actionable endeavour has been sought in the courts over what or who has primacy in 
terms of  fiduciary duties, judgement has invariably fallen to the management rather 
than to the shareholders (see especially Marens & Wicks 1999; Lan & Heracleaus 
2010) (5) . 
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The judgements reviewed in footnote 5  -- which form the basis for the ‘business 
judgement rule’ in the US courts (though this has been embodied in commercial law 
in other jurisdictions) protects the directors in the conduct of their ‘duty of care’ for 
the corporation and its employees. If the directors act in good faith, in the best 
interests of the corporation, on an informed basis, in a non-wasteful way and without 
personal interest (i.e., that they are ‘duly diligent’), then the courts have protected 
their position. But this remains the site of the real issue: is the ‘default position’ in 
respect to company operations that they should operate to maximize profits? Is it the 
ultimate purpose of a firm in current business law to generate profit, any deviation 
from which makes the managers ‘liable’? This is a complex issue which would 
ultimately depend upon the legal interpretations of the articles of association, but it 
looks as though this requirement remains an untested default position (6). 
 
Some would argue however, that it is continually tested by the range of measures 
associated with ‘shareholder protection’: involving not just ‘hard-case’ company law 
but also provisions found in securities law and in the ‘soft law’ of codes of corporate 
conduct and takeover regulation (Armour, et al., 2008). This discussion arose from 
the seminal contribution of La Porta et.al. (1998) who advanced the proposition that 
there were two basic forms of ‘legal origin’ as far as shareholder protection is 
concerned: civil law societies and common law societies. They went on to claim a) 
that common law societies systematically provided more effective protection of the 
shareholder interests and, b) this stimulated more robust economic development and 
growth. Whilst, in their terms, there had been some subsequent convergence between 
these legal systems – and a growing recognition that there were other ‘sub-systems’ 
within (or around) each core grouping (like a distinctive Scandinavian grouping 
within the civil law tradition) -- underlying differences between the two groups of 
countries have continued to provide the same differential consequences along the 
original lines of their analysis (Djankov, et al 2008)(7).  
This set of arguments has attracted a great deal of attention. Many criticisms have 
been made of -- and suggestions for improvements to-- the original La Porta 
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formulation, particularly in respect of how to construct a ‘correct’ index of 
‘shareholder protection’, and allocate countries in respect to this (e.g. Siems 2007; 
Spamann 2008; Siems 2009; Armour et al 2008 – Thompson & Mortensen 2009 
discuss the Danish literature on this issue). Broadly this challenges the idea of two 
clearly defined groupings as the differentiation and hybridization of each separate 
legal system is uncovered. Nevertheless the basic thrust of the attempt to link 
legal/regulatory systems to different degrees of shareholder protection continues in 
these critical studies. This remains contentious however. In general, this literature and 
debate ignores the earlier case histories that established the ‘business judgments rule’ 
discussed above. It takes this as a given, so it is not so much concerned with the 
deeper questions of ownership raised earlier. But, of course, it is centrally concerned 
with control, though here one might need to remain cautious. There is a considerable 
attention to the detail of control as demonstrated in the ex ante sense of what laws, 
rules and conventions are in place to try to prevent managers/directors exercising their 
‘agency’ at the expense of shareholders (see Armour 2008 in particular and the detail 
at: <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20output.htm>). 
Broadly speaking this involves the collection of data on ease of challenge over ‘self 
dealing’ on the part of directors, likelihood of success if action is taken, and some 
attention to important case judgments. So there is some consideration of the ex-post 
outcomes when challenges have been made in the courts or other arenas of regulation. 
But this is always difficult to judge and tends to vary on a case by case basis. It is all 
very well having ex-ante mechanisms is place but success with proof of 
misdemeanours and malpractices on the occasion of litigation is another matter. In 
general this still takes place under the shadow of the business judgment rule – which 
tends to protect the managers if they exercise due diligence. And – as recent events 
associated with various pre-crisis financial scandals and the 2007/08 financial crisis 
itself have surely demonstrated – these mechanisms proved hopelessly inadequate to 
prevent widespread abuse of shareholder interests and potential wrong-doing in 
‘common law’ countries in particular. The point here, then, is not to continually 
lament the lack of shareholder control, or to seek some further robust ultimate rule 
that guarantees shareholder primacy, but to recognize that – in situations of ‘normal 
business’ – despite there being enormous effort devoted to catering for shareholder 
interests and providing them with information about day to at operations and long 
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term strategy, all geared up to  serving shareholder value considerations, shareholders 
are necessarily remote from actual decision making. The emphasis, instead, needs to 
shift to better preparing the managers/directors for their role as the actual guardians of 
the company as an institution that owns itself, which is pursued below. 
Obviously a different set of legal conditions hold if the company is in liquidation, 
creditors having a prior claim over shareholders in this instance (see Carruthers & 
Halliday 1998, Halliday & Carruthers 2009). But even under these circumstances 
neither creditors nor shareholders can seize the company’s assets at will, so nor do 
they ‘own’ it is this sense . Here both shareholders and creditors are similarly 
constituted as ‘claimants’ with only a contingent title in respect to the company’s 
assets (Hohfeld 1919). 
 
In addition, claimants must act in accordance with due legal process. What this means 
in that legal rights in respect to any company are always highly specific and 
contingent, and what they impart to different agents are differential capacities and 
capabilities to undertake actions or engage in litigation. Legal rights do not 
exclusively or unconditionally guarantee access to ‘ownership’ or anything else but 
only arrange possibilities for undertaking litigation or initiating actionable endeavour 
in the courts. 
 
This point is important in several respects, particularly in the debates about ‘property 
rights’ in economics (and by extension for the ‘Law and Economics’ school). These 
do not impart an exclusive, unconstrained or unconditional possession to a definite 
subject or agent. It is not the case, then, that any attenuation of those rights – 
involving a circumscription or restraint on their exercise, usually thought to be 
imposed by the political process or the State – necessarily represents an unwarranted 
challenge to those rights of possession. ‘Property rights’ attribute no more (or no less) 
than a capacity or capability to initiate something (like a claim on the assets of a firm). 
But that guarantees nothing in terms of outcomes. It only contingently and 
conditionally arranges a series of possibilities for legal disputation and action. 
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The more general importance of this formulation is to move away from a discourse of 
‘rights’ to one about ‘claims’. Rights imply a possession by a constituted subject 
whereas claims only imply a contingent entitlement, one dependent upon particular 
circumstances (in the case here as specified by a legal framework). And this aspect of 
the law confirming claims rather than rights is well illustrated by bankruptcy law. 
Although Carruthers and Halliday’s comprehensive analysis situates bankruptcy in the 
terminology of rights in the first instance, it is clear from the discussion that it imparts 
various parties with a range of claims that must be tested in law (Carruthers & 
Halliday 1998; Halliday & Carruthers 2009). For instance, their Table1.1 ‘Ranking of 
Claims in Bankruptcy’, (my emphasis, 1998, p.39-40) sets out the hierarchy of 
claimants in the US and the UK, while ‘The Legal Constitution of Markets’ (Chapter 
1, 2009) extends this approach about the potential for disputation and enforceability 
during bankruptcy proceedings to the Asian countries. What is clear from this 
extensive analysis is that there are no general ‘rights fights’ only contingent claims 
dependent upon the particularities of each jurisdiction, its characteristics and 
institutional limitations. 
So with this conception there is no general public or private privileged possession of, 
or exclusion from, ‘ownership’. In principle the law could thus establish a set of 
‘rights’ that impart capacities and capabilities to any number of stakeholders without 
this necessarily undermining a deeper or more fundamental ‘ownership’ relation 
because, as agued above, rights in law are never rendered with respect to an exclusive 
possession, but only in respect to a claim. Here we see the way a discussion of the 
nature of company law could establish the principles for the wider notion of 
stakeholder democracy without this necessarily compromising a ‘deeper’ set of 
fundamental truths (as pursed in detail in Thompson 2008a). 
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Limited Liability (L-L) 
 
Let us now briefly turn to L-L. Limited liability as a ubiquitous feature of the modern 
business world. It was gradually introduced in the UK and the USA in the later part of 
the 19th Century (Plesch & Blankerburgh , 2007, pp.8-15). Prior to this development 
companies had unlimited liability. The idea was that such a legal limitation on 
shareholder losses would foster investment and the development of industrial 
capitalism. Subsequently it spread throughout the world. And whilst this was a clear 
move in terms of legislation in these countries, the status of legal personality just 
discussed was only afforded companies as a result of a series of landmark decisions 
by the courts (as already mentioned: Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railway 
Co. in 1886 in the US and Salomon v. Salomon & Co. in the UK in 1897). And whilst 
it was not the original intention of company law legislation to extend the status of 
legal personality to companies, governmental authorities have done little to prevent its 
application. But is has been essentially a court led process. 
 
What we have as a result, however, is a very privileged position for companies in the 
way they are allowed to operate, involving legal immunities not extended to ordinary 
citizens (Ireland 1999 & 2010). As a result they are often accused of having extensive 
rights without concomitant responsibilities. Certainly this accusation can be 
legitimately laid at the door of shareholders and directors, who can for all intents a 
purposes avoid any personal liability for misdemeanours or damages they may cause 
(Directors, for instance, can insure against this possibility). But shareholders can also 
escape liability in the case of tort actions as will be discussed in a moment. 
 
 This stacks the legal cards very much in favour of the corporate world against the rest 
of civil society independently of the enormous power companies can wielded because 
of their wealth, financial muscle and political influence. What is more, in as much as 
companies have been in the forefront in arguing for their release from the many 
shackles of the law and regulation – to free them up and let them take responsibility 
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for their own actions -- they have single-mindedly failed to add the abandonment of 
limited liability to this list of demands. Thus there may be a limit to how far 
companies will support what might otherwise seem to be a rather self-serving neo-
liberal project. 
 
L-L is about the protection of assets and creditor confidence. It is the principle 
whereby a member of a company cannot be made personally liable for the debts of the 
company beyond the capital invested, or, in general, beyond a certain amount. 
Debtors or plaintiffs in any action against the company thus make their claims against 
the property or assets of the company, not those of its shareholders. Shareholders are 
only liable to their own personal creditors. Clearly, L-P and L-L are different but 
complimentary aspects of company form. 
 
 “[legal personality] protects the assets of the firm from the creditors of the 
firm’s owners, while limited liability protects the assets of  the firm’s 
owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors”  (Kraakman, et al., 2004, 
pp.7-8) (8). 
 
Both L-L and L-P are argued to make better deals possible because they instil 
confidence. But L-L also reduces confidence because it limits the pool from which 
debts can be paid. L-L does not exist if you have to put up personal assets as 
guarantees. Thus L-L means you do not need to know who the other investors are, i.e. 
fellow shareholders – or their wealth. As a result the aptly named société anomie 
produces a bigger investment pool and greater investment. 
 
But L-L is paradoxical in respect to confidence and risk. On the one hand it reduces 
risks for the shareholders. L-L and shareholding means that the shareholder knows 
what his/her liabilities are. He/she is not responsible for any thing other than the value 
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of his/her share-holding. But on the other hand it might encourage companies to take 
on more risk than is socially justifiable, as explained in the next section. 
 
‘Hiding Behind the Veil’ and Tort Claims 
 
Owner-shareholders and top executives exercise immense power in society both 
locally and globally. But they are not immediately responsible for any damage they 
might cause the environment for instance. Essentially this means that if a company 
fails or is sued for damages, the shareholder only looses the sum of money they have 
invested in the company. And directors and top management – as agents of the 
shareholder within the company  -- are similarly protected. If they cause a harm to a 
third party they are potentially subject to a ‘tort claim’ which are considered in the 
civil courts. But shareholders – and to a large extent company directors -- can escape 
personal liability under these circumstances because the company exists under limited 
liability. 
 
In addition companies use their limited liability status to minimize their exposure to 
tort claims. A successful tort claim would result in seeking redress via the liquidation 
of company assets to pay the fine or meet the compensation. But the modern 
corporation is a many tiered structure with a myriad of subsidiaries and holding 
companies. This legal structure can be used quite legitimately to ‘hide’ assets or to 
limit exposure to particular risky ventures (where damage and a subsequent tort claim 
might arise). This is known as ‘hiding behind the veil’. Under present conditions this 
is quite legal, if not exactly ethical. But it also means companies can ensure against or 
avoid some liabilities associated with their behaviour that ‘natural persons’ like 
ourselves cannot. This might tempt them to take added risks and act irresponsible. 
 
But problems arise when the creditor is replaced by the victim (involving Torts – 
involuntary harms). L-L thrives upon the distinction between contracting party and 
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tort victim. Torts involve involuntary harms that are not ‘dealed’ or contracted. 
Shareholders can avoid liabilities to tort victims – because they are only liable up to 
the value of their shareholdings. As they are allowed to do this shareholders of L-L 
companies might take more risks than is socially justified. Companies can also 
arrange their structures to create subsidiaries that absorb or bear the risks but do not 
have enough capital (shares) to cover eventualities associated with Torts if they create 
harms. This means they can escape responsibilities for harms if this comes to law. 
 
What can be done about this? Companies could insure against this eventuality – or be 
forced to do so. Alternatively, torts victims could be made a priority in terms of 
‘claims on assets’. In effect, this would mean abandoning separate company 
personality and L-L in Tort cases. Finally, the ‘corporate veil’ can be ‘pierced’ – the 
corporate veil is when companies create subsidiaries that disguise the true risks/capital 
involved in different aspects of their businesses, so that they can avoid the 
responsibilities/liabilities if they are sued for Torts. To pierce this veil responsibilities 
could be shifted up the line of company structure until somewhere were found where 
losses could be covered. In fact, attitudes towards piercing the corporate veil vary 
considerably between different jurisdictions: the UK legislative system and courts are 
the most reluctant to countenance this possibility, the US somewhere in between 
(though also the most litigious), but German (and Japanese) authorities are the least 
hesitant in allowing such claims to be pursued (Miller 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Corporations and Moral Personhood 
 
One difficulty in the corporate citizenship debate revolves around whether companies 
can be legitimately considered as equivalent to ‘moral persons’. This is particularly 
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important from the point of view of their citizenship rights since one of the attributes 
of ‘natural persons’ is that they are imparted with a certain moral agency: as subjects 
of rights they must administer those rights in the form of intentions and can be held 
individually responsible and subject to an accountability dimension as a consequence. 
In that companies are increasingly claiming to be ethical entities – undertaking public 
duties and paying particular attention to the moral consequences of their actions  -- 
they are demanding concomitant rights accordingly. 
This issue has generated an enormous body of literature and discussion and it is not 
my intention to review this all here (though see French 1979 and Wherhane 1985 for 
the basis of my remarks here; and also Thompson 2008b). A central issue is that the 
legal personhood of companies imparts them with a decision making procedure and 
capacity that pertains to their own activity as such. But although these corporate rules 
and procedures specify organizational behaviour they seldom define the ‘intent’ of 
those rules or behaviour. So the question arises as to whether the concept of 
intentionality can be appropriately ascribed to corporations at all. On the other hand it 
is surprising how frequently this has become part of corporate behaviour: articles of 
association and mission statements abound with such statements. In as much as 
corporate internal decision structures (CIDs) incorporate and impart these objectives 
into properly considered procedures that are followed through, events are re-described 
as corporate policy and attributions made accordingly. In effect, these become the 
‘intentionality’ of the corporation independently of those of its officers. But in as 
much that corporate responsibility can become re-described as social responsibility 
does this necessarily coincide with them being morally culpable? (Wherhane 1985, 
p.47.) 
Whilst this debate continues – and there is very much more that could be said about it 
– below I make an attempt to circumvent its terms by setting up corporate citizenship 
in a different manner: this involves asking the question of the persona of citizenship 
in a corporate context. As explored below, the idea of a persona is that this is a 
deliberately constructed ‘image’ involving a range of determinations that are 
exercised, enacted and performed rather than being moral or ethical beliefs or values 
held as a consequences of a subjectivity. This also goes to further disrupt the 
discourse of rights that saturates this and any other discussion of moral personhood. 
20 
 
However, before that it will be useful to examine the extent of the claims to be 
‘citizens’ by companies, and who is addressing them as such. 
 
How is Corporate Citizenship Being ‘Made’? 
 
This section returns to the issue of what is involved with the conception of corporate 
citizenship, in particular with how citizenship is being constructed both for companies 
and by them: how are companies (re)presenting their position? Such a discussion 
provides the underlying contours for a consideration of the way they are constructing 
their political character: their political persona. 
 
The question to ask in this case is whether corporate citizenship is about the public 
mindedness of companies? About them recovering a spirit of humanity in an 
expression of their civic virtue? This is what companies are themselves claiming as 
the key aspects of their citizenship. But on the other hand is it more about the 
possession of certain definite powers and capacities derived from a certain position 
occupied in the domestic and international sphere? Is the source of their citizenship to 
be found in the persona of the modern corporate personality, its powers and 
capacities, its attributes imagined and fostered  and not in the form of some ‘ideal’ of 
citizenship? (Burchell 1995 & 1999). Thus to ask the question of the persona of the 
corporation is to ask the question in a way that avoids issues of direct moral agency. 
Rather it speaks to a performativity and an enactment by companies themselves. 
 
Modern personal citizenship derives its capacities from the activities of government, I 
would argue, not from nature. In the case of companies and GCC are these capacities 
derived analogously from bodies like the UN Global Compact, the WEF and the US 
Chamber of Commerce – each of which deliberately addresses its members as 
citizens? Are these the places where companies are made fit for citizenship by self-
formation and self-discipline operating through the category of ‘responsibilization’, or 
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rather through the practice of responsibilization (Thompson 2008b)? How is this 
practice acquired and fostered as a set of practical skills and routineized functioning? 
 
This approach would emphasise the spaces of forum like the UN Global Compact and 
the WEF as the places where these obligations are fostered. They represent a 
‘welcoming association’ for the rhetorical examination of responsibility. Similarly 
with company backed conferences about CSR and GCC, like those organized by the 
magazine Ethical Corporation and the US Chamber of Commerce. These spaces 
constitute a kind of ‘clan network’ encouraging the activity of citizenly self-
cultivation by those companies attending. 
 
And it is important that these places represent a kind of private sphere. This provides 
the conditions for this activity to be seen as a matter of companies expressing their 
freedom, away from direct governmental sponsoring or interference. Companies 
become the civic minded ‘burghers’ of these private associations. Having been to 
several of these conferences I can testify that they are full of declarations of public 
spiritedness by companies. An exhortatory style is in evidence that sometimes smacks 
of civic revivalism. So these are an occasion for a declaratory outwardness dependent 
upon an inward self-reflection and moral discipline. 
 
And these conferences/meetings are important in another respect. They are places 
where all sorts of manuals of best practice are marketed and sold: handbooks of ‘how 
to do it’, describing how to be a good corporate citizen. Publishing companies like 
Earthscan and particularly Greenleaf market a series of these, one of the most 
interesting of which is Raising the Bar ( Fussler, et al. 2004,  which has become 
almost the bible of how to work the UN Global Compact, and Jonker & de Witte 
2006) . These are books of conduct and civic instruction, offering technique, practical 
and moral guidance through the maze of risks associated with non-sustainability. 
They say to companies ‘examine yourself and then do this’. 
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Also around these conference and meetings are to be found consultants, hovering like 
hawks ready to swoop on any unsuspecting company representative. Risk analysis? 
We can do it for you! Reputation management? We can do it for you! Writing your 
yearly Sustainability Report? We can do it for you! These consultancy firms provide a 
support mechanism for cultivating a sense of corporate citizenship. 
 
And finally endorsement by a high profile academic is also important. John Ruggie 
fulfils this role for the UN Global Compact (Ruggie 2005) and now in respect to the 
UN Human Rights Commission in its attempt to extend full human rights into the 
corporate world (Ruggie 2008). Michael Porter fulfils a similar role for the WEF in 
terms of its general programme of corporate citizenship (Porter and Kramer 2006; 
WEF 2008 – a discussion which Porter chaired). 
 
Companies as Political Players 
 
This outline of the basic attributes and dimensions of ‘corporate citizenship’ serves to 
introduce a wider discussion of the political role of companies, something opened up 
in a most interesting manner by Crane, et.al’s (2008) Corporations and Citizenship.  
Companies have for a long while presented a problem for democratic politics (e.g. 
Gerencser 2005; Patton & Bartlett 1981): they have many legal rights and they claim 
others through their actions but what about their obligations and responsibilities? One 
thing the earlier discussion of company citizenship demonstrates is that companies are 
beginning to think about claiming a stronger status recognition for their citizenly 
activities associated with their pursuit of civic virtue and  the performance of civic 
duties.. 
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A first difficulty is that the emphasis on citizenship may obscure rather than reveal the 
political role of companies. Even in respect to natural persons citizenship is only one 
way that political activity is conducted. There are many categories of persons who are 
not necessarily citizens but who legitimately participate in political activity or have 
rights and obligations; like holders of visas or work permits, (illegal) immigrants, 
asylum seekers, visitors, etc. And those who can claim or are granted the ‘right of 
citizenship’ have changed dramatically over the years, e.g. in respect to gender and 
racial categories, ethnic and marital statuses, ‘blood ties’, etc. So citizenship in not a 
homogeneous category for natural persons, even in strict legal terms: it is contested 
and always subject to review. 
 
And the same goes for companies as legal persons and what they can legitimately 
claim or do as analogous to persons. A sensitive matter is around the issue of ‘free 
speech’, particularly in the USA where this is protected by the First Amendment. This 
allows – indeed encourages -- citizens to actively support candidates, make donations 
to political parties and individual candidates for office. But how far does this stretch 
in respect to companies as citizens? (Patton & Bartlett 1981). The American courts 
have – if not so much found in favour of companies – declared that the First 
Amendment does indeed apply to companies as a result of their recognized 
personhood in law, so they can become legitimate political actor in this respect. In 
many ways they are no different to natural persons in their political capacities to 
influence political policies and decisions (subject to certain – highly disputable – 
restrictions; see Patton & Bartlett 1981 and Gerencser 2005 for the terms of this 
debate – as in the UK companies are not allowed to offer direct financial support to 
particular candidates for political office). In addition, there are several ‘legal statuses’ 
available to companies which affect their rights and capacities, e.g. Chapter 11 in the 
USA, ‘in administration’ in the UK, temporary suspension of trading on Stock 
Exchanges, for instance. So companies as ‘citizens’ are not homogeneous in any 
natural way, no more so than are natural persons. 
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Of course, in as much that the law treats agents similarly as citizens it treats them as 
‘equals’: they are equal before the law. But this cannot account for the very unequal 
distribution of wealth, power and influence of different citizenly agents as exists 
outside of the law. This itself raises further complex issue about the role of companies 
in participative and deliberative aspects of democratic activity, but similar problems 
arise in respect to individual citizens as well, so companies are not unique, but they 
may expose these problems in a rather acute manner. 
 
Pursuing the consequences of this form of analysis of the precise relationship between 
ownership and control invites a return in the first instance to the debates in the 1930s 
and 1940s over the original ‘divorce of ownership from control’ thesis, which took 
place mainly around Berle & Means book The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932). The thesis of this book is too well known to be rehearsed in detail so 
I concentrate upon the way this is being currently re-interpreted (Ireland 1999, 2010; 
Ireland & Pillay 2009; Strasser & Blumberg 2011; Biondi et al 2007; Ho 2009). This 
has largely to do with the notion of ‘enterprise entity’ and ‘enterprise analysis’ that 
was widely discussed in the 1930s and 1940s (Berle 1932, 1947; Berle & Means 
1932; Dodd 1932, 1935, 1941). As we will see in a moment the company considered 
as an entity is contrasted to it viewer as a multi-layered company with many 
subsidiaries and holding structures. While these separate elements may have no 
necessary operational significance as a matter of business reality or social expectation, 
the standard legal practice is saturated with them, focusing on separate subsidiary 
corporations and imposing legal requirement of responsible behavior only on them. 
The result is often poor legal decisions in respect to the requirements for corporate 
social responsibility. 
Berle & Means posed the issue of the consequences for ‘corporate governance’ of the 
divorce of control from ownership and the growth in importance of the managers 
(controllers) relative to the shareholders (owners). Originally, Berle in particular was 
concerned to re-establish the traditional conception of shareholders as owners though 
later he modified his position and developed the idea of the firm as an ‘entity’ which 
needed to be considered as such in its own terms (9). But the nature of this entity is the 
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key issue (Bratton & Wachter 2007). Under pressure from Dodd’s arguments the idea 
of an entity not exclusively beholden to the owners/shareholders emerged. And this 
was the ‘reality’ of the way the modern company operated – so these authors adopted 
the corporate ‘real person’ conception of company personhood as outlined in 
Thompson (2009a). Berle recognized that the company was not just a ‘bank account 
with rules about who had access to its resources’ (as my corporate lawyer friend had 
suggested): it was not just a collection of corporate papers, minute books, account 
books, and a bank account, but a real organizational entity with many functions and 
aspects. Increasingly this organized entity was being pressured to operate socially and 
recognizing the need to operate in a socially responsible manner, mainly at the behest 
of outside social influences, but also, crucially, by the insider managers and directors 
rather than the shareholder-owners -- who were now remote from the company as an 
organizational entity. This was the concrete consequences of the divorce of ownership 
from control. So, the firm needed to be both reconfigured conceptually and in a legal 
sense; to recognize this changed nature of its existence. It needed to be 
reconceptualised as a ‘singular entity’ and confirmed in law as such. Hence the ideas 
of the ‘enterprise entity’ and of ‘enterprise analysis’. Berle and Means argued that the 
established difference between limited liability and corporate personhood in respect to 
company law inhibited this ‘unifying’ conception: the distinction needed to be 
reformulated so that the cyborg nature of the firm could be overcome (it being both a 
‘person’ and an ‘entity’ in law as discussed above). 
Several political implications follow from this presentation. First it enables us to 
revisit the question of shareholder ownership. In effect the idea of an ‘enterprise 
entity’ undercuts this further. The company must be run ‘for itself’, by managers, who 
become the ‘trustees’ of the institutional assets (Berle 1932; Dodd 1932), taking 
account of a diverse range of variable social and commercial objectives (10). And the 
idea of an ‘internalized’ trusteeship of managers nicely complements the idea of the 
‘externalized’ corporate persona being constructed by/for the company as outlined in 
Thompson (2009a, see also Thompson 2012 forthcoming). Trusteeship would involve 
cultivating obligations to stockholders, to employees and to customers and the general 
public – safely, honestly, wisely, properly, and stressing the obligations of performing 
public duties as a good citizen (Dodd 1932, p.1154: quoting a speech by the business 
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executive Mr.Owen D Young, 1928 – this involved the first explicit reference to the 
idea of ‘corporate citizenship’ that I have been able to find in the literature).  
Of course quite how this form of internal trusteeship might be formed and ‘enforced’ 
would be crucial. Here one might appeal to the idea of civic prudence and fortitude, 
originally proposed as a way of constructing an impartial integrity amongst public 
officials (Pufendorf [1668] 1991; Hunter 2001; Minson 2006). This is predicated on a 
system of impersonal and jurisdictionally delimited offices cultivated by the wise and 
worldly application of sociality and reason. It involves neither a reliance on the higher 
moral values of officials as enlightened human beings nor the blind trust in the virtues 
of their guardianship. Rather it involves a system of practical obligatory commitments 
and integrity built amongst officials who relate their activities to the capacities of the 
office to which they are attached rather than to their own personal interests, values or 
proclivities. Whilst this ‘system of offices’ was originally conceived to relate to public 
officials, the suggestion here is to extend its applicability to the directing personnel of 
a new ‘quasi-civic milieu’ within the private but citizenly corporation. This would be 
‘policed’ in the first instance through social entanglements and peer pressures 
amongst the office bearers within the corporation, and beyond – a self-disciplining via 
mutual scrutiny of tasks, advice giving and monitoring. 
Given that – again as a matter of fact – shareholders do not contemporarily contribute 
much net investment resources in the aggregate for American (or British) corporations 
as pointed out above, any strong idea of legitimate shareholders rights in control is 
further undermined. What is more, enterprise analysis could in principle ‘solve’ the 
problem of ‘hiding behind the veil’ (Strasser & Blumberg 2011; Thompson 2009a). It 
would treat corporate holding companies in a group as a single ‘enterprise entity’ 
from the point of view of corporate law. Virtually all large contemporary businesses 
are organized into separate corporations – subsidiaries – which are owned in a 
hierarchical structure by a parent company which is in actual charge of the whole 
enterprise group. Standard corporate law treats each of these subsidiaries as a separate 
legal entity, with its own rights and responsibilities. What is more, the shareholders of 
the subsidiaries are not responsible for its obligations beyond the extent of their 
investments, even when the shareholder is the parent corporation which controls the 
whole enterprise. Thus limited liability means the parent may not be held responsible 
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for the obligations of the whole enterprise. Strasser and Blumberg (2011) suggest six 
criteria for determining and assessing enterprise entity analysis: the extent of control 
between parts of company, the extent of economic integration between these parts, the 
extent of administrative interdependence, of financial interdependence, and of 
employee interdependence, and finally whether the company has a common public 
persona. These criteria would be used to determine whether a company and its parts 
comprised a single entity or not. Such an entity would then be treated as a single 
persona from the point of view of its legal incorporation. 
 
Thus revisiting the idea of ‘enterprise analysis’ enables a reconsideration of the legal 
constitution of companies, and sets out an agenda for the reform of corporate law that 
provides a more effective way of reconciling the fact that the shareholder does not 
‘own’ the company. It also provides an intellectual case for a wider consideration of 
‘stakeholder democracy’ (Gerencser 2005 – see also Davies 2009). 
But what of the general trajectory for companies of the future? What can we expect 
from both the context of corporate development and the nature of corporate 
engagement itself with this evolving business environment? Here we first need to 
sketch out what might be the macro framework for economic reform in a post crisis 
world and what role companies could play in this. Thus here we shift from an analysis 
of the legal constitution of companies to consider the consequences of the issues and 
problems it highlights for corporate reform in the context of how the modern 
corporation is influenced by the wider economic and political environment. In 
particular, this discussion focuses on the specifics of the post financial crisis world as 
providing the crucial context for the evolution of corporate activity. Of necessity this 
will be more speculative that the previous formulations since it look ahead towards 
future prospects. 
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POST 2009 PROSPECTS FOR THE POLITICAL REFORM OF THE 
COMPANY 
 
Whist the era of strict ‘market fundamentalism’ and market hegemony may be over as 
a consequence of the 2007-08 financial crisis, market discipline may not be so readily 
dispatched. We live in a period of resigned, resentful and disaffected consent to 
market disciplining and will continue to do so for a long time yet. So a resort to 
market regulation and the celebration of the market mechanisms, with all it entails, is 
unlikely to go away.  Since the business world knows this ground well it would 
probably welcome such a return to the normal routine of  ‘business as usual’ as 
quickly as possible. 
 
On the other hand what about the possibility of reconstructing a new framework for 
social democracy in the wake of the crisis? Can Keynesianism be revived for instance, 
in relation to which companies would have to adapt their operational trajectories? 
There is an important debate to be had here some of the possible contours of which 
have already been sketched out (Clift & Tomlinson 2006a, 2006b; Hay 2006; Crouch 
2008). But whatever happens politically it is unlikely that traditional Keynesian in its 
‘fine-tuning’ form could be easily revived (manipulating aggregate demand over the 
business cycle to achieve full employment), though some form of ‘coarse-tuning’ 
Keynesianism might still prove attractive and possible across the political spectrum. 
Indeed, this is exactly the reaction as a direct consequence of the crisis – massive 
stimulus packages in the USA, the UK and elsewhere (and in China in a different 
context) to prevent wholesale economic collapse. But whether this could be repeated 
again, and its full long-term consequences,  remain unclear. 
 
Colin Crouch (2008) suggests that after a period of ‘privatized Keynesianism’ – the 
maintenance of aggregate demand via private credit provision to stimulate 
consumption, which he suggests was the a characteristic feature of the ‘long 
moderation’ between 1995 and 2007 (something Clift and Tomlinson would challenge 
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perhaps) (11)  --  the likely alternative is to see a new, if uneasy, political modus 
operandi  develop between big business and the state where companies either make 
public policy themselves or do so alongside governments and in partnership with 
them. This is an interesting suggestion and one that could easily develop serious 
momentum in one form or another as either neo-liberal market fundamentalism or any 
new social democratic Keynesianism prove insufficient to the task. Further off-
loading ‘public’ provision of infrastructures and operational services to the private 
corporate sector will look like a temptation fiscally constrained governments find just 
too difficult to resist.  The headlong rush toward fiscal austerity – enthusiastically in 
the UK, out of necessity in most of southern- Europe, perhaps less enthusiastically in 
the USA though significantly there nevertheless  -- confirms that the private sector 
will in all likelihood step into the gap left by the state as it further abandons socially 
provided welfare services (12) and infrastructure developments. 
 
And this would place ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) back at the centre of 
business strategy. As mentioned above in the introductory remarks to this chapter, 
individually vulnerable companies are trying to bolster their position politically in 
various ways. One of these is to seek the protection offered by being seen as 
practicing ‘social responsibility’. CSR, along with corporate citizenship, represents a 
way companies are seeking to secure their position: offering responsibility in 
exchange for claiming protective rights in various ways; seeking consumer brand 
loyalty; securing public commitments via best practice recognition of environmental 
and ethical standards, etc. Companies are tentatively exploring this territory, gradually 
feeling their way into a new politicized arena, not necessarily by seeking direct 
support or overt protection but by presenting themselves as agents of a public 
purpose, being ‘good citizens’, performing civic duties and virtuous deeds, etc.   
 
But as companies are invited to take more and more responsibility for providing what 
were traditionally considered to be publicly provided services – or as they quietly 
draw these into the operational orbit – the demands for transparency and 
accountability for that provision will significantly increase. This would present the 
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need to examine the possible contours of this in some detail. In this context an 
important distinction needs to be drawn between classic ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (addressing mainly firm externalities); ‘corporate charity’ (extending 
and performing ‘good works’ in a local context), and finally; ‘corporate 
philanthropy’; that is, the provision of public and merit goods on a much wider scale 
in contexts unconnected to the direct business activity of the firms involved, which is 
already a significant current development. And corporate philanthropy – or 
‘Philanthro-capitalism’ as it is more grandly titled (Bishop and Green 2008) offers a 
tempting solution to the problem fiscally constrained governments have in 
maintaining the provision of ‘public services’. The foundations and funds financed by 
billionaire philanthropists, for instance  – of which there are many with billions of 
dollars to spend  (Fleishman 2009) – are rapidly moving in to fill the gap, based upon 
their own assessments of ‘public need’ and armed with business expertise to increase 
efficiency as they see it. This is a major trend and one that is likely to grow. But is it 
legitimate to let billionaire business persons determine the agenda here, and will it 
improve matters (Edwards 2008)? This is a pressing issue and one that poses deep 
political questions about corporate objectives, their transparency and accountability – 
and more generally about democratic control of their activities under these 
circumstances. In addition to these forms of private backed initiatives we could see a 
renewed emphasis from this quarter on ‘social entrepreneurship’ and ‘social 
enterprise’ (12), which would again stress social responsibility and civic virtue in the 
establishment and conduct of new business ventures.  
 
Thus we have the conditions for a revival of considerations of corporate social 
responsibility: the fact that private companies look set, in one way or another, to 
increase their activity in respect to concerns of civic virtue and therefore need to be 
held to account for that activity. This should put added pressure on reforming the 
model of the Anglo-American corporation. The idea that this is almost exclusively 
beholden to the interests of shareholders, and to shareholder value, was undermined 
by the detailed legal analysis of the company form conducted above.  This opens up 
the case for the recognition of a wider set of  social obligations, for treating the 
company as an enterprise entity in law, and of foregrounding a new sensibility to the  
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centrality of  ‘managerial responsibility’ in the conduct of its business. 
 
On the other hand there is the wider challenge posed by the changed macro-
environment in which companies are going to have to operate. The implications of 
this further splinter the notion of who owns the firm and what its purposes are. As 
new tasks are laid at the door of the traditional company, and new forms of company 
incorporation emerge, the case for reform is further strengthened. The company as an 
operational entity, its existence in law, its characteristic public persona, and its 
renewed mandate to support civic virtue should become the proper object of public 
policy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
By way of conclusion let us return to the idea of a ‘socially responsible company’ 
(SRC) mentioned above in connection to enterprise entity analysis. As Ireland (1999) 
has stressed, this is not the same as traditionally understood by CSR just described: it 
is much more radical in it implications, moving beyond simple amelioratory activity 
to encompass radical reform and corporate democracy. Such an idea of the SRC 
would seem to fit better with the current political conjuncture as just sketched. All the 
developments discussed in the previous section, for instance, pose the need for a 
deeper examination of the purposes of corporate behaviour and its public scrutiny. So 
perhaps even SRC  -- let alone CSR -- does not go quite far enough to embed wider 
notions of company social and commercial responsibility: to provide it with a set of 
incentives and penalties that will ensure proper trusteeship and citizenly persona. 
Thus instead of treating corporate citizenship cautiously, essentially thinking of the 
company as not a ‘proper citizen’ but as a kind of secondary citizen (in contrast to the 
primary citizenship of natural persons), a very bold step would be to declare 
companies as ‘full citizens’ with many of the rights and obligations and 
responsibilities of other citizens, and enforce these rigorously through the law if 
necessary (13). Giving companies full citizenship rights – indeed forcing them to 
become proper citizens -- with all the consequences that follow from this: not only to 
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perform friendly good works and civic duties as outlined above but, for instance, also 
‘to come to the aid of the state when threatened’ (a key responsibility of citizenship – 
Skinner 1993) – would itself pose a radical re-appraisal of company form and activity. 
But it is one worth seriously considering as companies threaten to become the new 
primary providers of public goods and services more generally. 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1) This is testified to by the acrimonious discussion of the entry for ‘corporate 
personhood’ on the Wikipedia web-site; see also Keeley 1981. 
2) As Teubner (2006) amply demonstrates bringing animals before the court to face 
charges is not a new phenomenon.  For him anything that participates in 
communication (however remotely) can in principle be considered analogously as a 
‘person in law’: this is particularly so of associations of non-human (‘actuants’) and 
human interactions (‘hybrids’) operating in social sub-systems. 
3) This might need to be modified a little since the succession in the UK is governed 
by the 1701 Act of Settlement. This limits heirs to the thrown to a Protestant line 
derived directly from Electress Sophia of Hanover and her descendents. Thus the 
matter of who inherits the crown in the UK is, strictly speaking, a legal matter not an 
ecumenical one or divine one. On the other hand the popular imagination is saturated 
with notions of the divine inheritance of the crown. 
4) As Iwai comments: 
“These duties specify the standards for judging the ‘trustworthiness’ and 
‘fairness’ of the managers' decisions and transactions which may conflict 
with the best interests of the corporation. And these standards usually 
include the so-called ‘duty of care’,  the restraint on ‘excessive’ 
managerial compensations, the strict rule on the disclosure of information, 
and the prohibition of self-dealing, trading corporate opportunity, trading 
on inside information, and outright theft.” (1999, p.623) 
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When shareholders enter the Board they too must adopt these standards and 
constraints. 
But this idea of fiduciary duties is controversial. Despite some ambiguities, Kraakman 
et al.2004, and particularly Parkinson 1993 argue against this position. Indeed, these 
authors of well established textbooks remain the main contemporary ideologues for 
the direct shareholder ownership position. 
5) McSeeney (2009, p.839) quotes from Aranson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805 
Supreme Court of Delaware, [1984] where Justice Moore argued “A cardinal precept 
of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than 
shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.” 8 Del.C. § 141(a). 
This is doubly important since Delaware is the state where most US businesses are 
incorporated, and is thought to have the most ‘liberal’ (read ‘business friendly’) 
corporate law regime. But these declarations have a longer history and apply to other 
jurisdictions in the USA. For instance, the idea that a company’s board of directors is 
subject to any sort of direct ‘agency’ relationship with that firm’s shareholders, 
requiring ongoing subservience to the latter’s expressed interests, was dispelled in a 
line of cases decided by the New York courts beginning in the 1850s..  
“[t]he board of directors of a corporation do not stand in the same relation 
to the corporate body which a private agent holds toward his principal. In 
the strict relation of principal and agent, all the authority of the latter is 
derived by legislation from the former,…[b]ut in corporate bodies the 
powers of the board of directors are, in a very important sense, original 
and undelegated… in the sense of being received from the State in the act 
of incorporation.”  Justice Comstock inthe case of  Hoyt v Thompson’s 
Executor, (1859) 19 N.Y. 207 (Court of Appeals of New York), p. 216.  
This line or reasoning was reiterated by Justice Chase of the same Court when he set 
out the basic principles of what is today known in corporate law jurisprudence as the 
business judgement rule: “the individual directors making up the board are not mere 
employees, but a part of an elected body of officers constituting the executive agents 
of the corporation.” So that directors “hold such office charged with the duty to act for 
the corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing they cannot be 
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controlled in the reasonable exercise and performance of such duty” (People ex rel. 
Manice v Powell, (1911) 201 N.Y. 194 (Court of Appeals of New York), p. 201). 
A similar legal position can be discerned in the case of UK company law, despite that 
fact that shareholders in the UK model are granted somewhat wider democratic 
powers. Moore and Rebérioux (2010) quote from Lord Justice Couzens Hardy to the 
effect that: “it is a fallacy to say that the relation [between shareholders and the board] 
is that of simple principal and agent. …I do not think it is true to say that the directors 
are agents. I think it is more nearly true to say that they are in the position of 
managing partners appointed to fill that post by a mutual arrangement between all the 
shareholders.’ (Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v Cunninghame, [1906] 
2 Ch 34 (Court of Appeal), p. 45). 
6) Drawing  from Moore and Rebérioux (2010) once again: “‘[i]f powers of 
management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise those 
powers. The only way in which the general body of shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering the articles, 
or, if the opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of 
whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by 
the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the 
powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders.’ (John Shaw & Sons 
v Shaw & Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113, p. 134).   
7) Here it is recognized that the discussion of shareholder rights remains solely within 
the frame of differences between legal traditions: common law versus civil law 
jurisdictions, and does not consider alternative explanations of how shareholder rights 
are constructed e.g. political explanations. The political literature in this respect is 
particularly instructive (see Roe 2003, Gourevitch 2003, Gourevitch & Shinn 2005, 
Coffi 2010 and Culpepper 2011) but a thorough discussion of these contributions 
would take us into a somewhat different territory. The analysis provided here 
concentrates on the legal literature for the good reason that a critical examination of 
this exposes the ambiguities and contradictions in one of the strongest justificatory 
discourses supporting shareholder supremacy and that champions a complacent legal 
reasoning. 
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(8) Note that Kraakman et al (2004) still refer to the shareholders as ‘owners’: indeed 
throughout their book this is the terminology used. But I would suggest that their own 
description and analysis reinforces the points made in the main text about this not 
being the case. It is Hansmann & Kraakmann 2001 that provide an argument that 
every legal system is moving towards their favoured model of direct shareholder 
ownership (a point reinforced in the second edition of Kraakman et al, 2009). 
(9) Many years ago I discussed the nature of the corporation as a ‘dispersed social 
agency’ (Thompson 1982). I insisted then, as I would reiterate now in the context of 
this debate, that considering the firm as an ‘entity’ does not necessarily involve 
considering it as a ‘unity’. This should be borne in mind as the discussion proceeds in 
the main text. 
(10) This is what Clerc (2009) terms ‘the corporate interest’ model of corporate 
governance. 
 (11) As a matter of fact, consumption as a percent of GDP did not rise between 2001 
and 2007, indeed in the UK and Germany it fell slightly (Lapavitsas 2010, Figure 8). 
However, household debt as a percentage of GDP did increase significantly in the UK 
and the USA (but not in Japan or Germany), which was used mainly to finance 
housing. The general problem for the ‘privatized Keynesianism’ thesis is the way 
public expenditure also expanded in the period of the long moderation in many 
countries. Thus -- at a minimum – the thesis would need to examine the differences 
between countries where it genuinely was private lending that drove the boom (e.g., 
Denmark, where private household debt as a percentage of GDP had escalated to the 
highest level amongst OECD countries in 2008, closely followed by the Netherlands) 
and those countries where it was of less significance (e.g., Japan and Germany – and 
even the UK). 
(12) Of course there is always an alternative variation waiting in the wings. In the 
case of the private provision of welfare services, this is not to provide theses directly 
via private firms, but to organize a market in welfare derivatives, one where 
individuals insure themselves against loss of income arising for various reasons, 
through the development of insurance futures and tradable derivative contracts 
(Hacker 2006.). This would represent a return to a kind of market fundamentalism. 
(13)  Hansmann (2000) explores the ownership implications of these types of 
enterprise in an interesting, if rather neglected, way. In the UK there are a range of 
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corporate forms that might be mobilized into this social enterprise agenda: traditional 
Industrial and Provident Societies; Company Limited by Guarantee; Company 
Limited by Shares and Community Interest Company. As yet these company forms do 
not challenge the ubiquity of  the traditional limited liability company, either in terms 
of extent or size, but they provide a mechanism by which social objectives could be 
pursued and charitable objectives advanced, particularly in the context of the ‘Big 
Society’ idea currently being popularised by the Coalition Government in the UK. 
 
(14) One might want to draw the line at allowing companies to vote in elections 
however, though in some jurisdictions this still happens, e.g. in the City of London.  
This has an unusual governmental structure made up of the Lord Mayor and The 
Court of Common Council which comprises Aldermen who are in part elected by City 
corporate businesses and commercial partnerships not just by resident individuals. 
(see <http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/about_us/governing.htm >). In 
addition, Hong Kong, has special representatives of certain commercial interests who 
can vote in the legislature, who are not exactly elected by individual voters, but, in 
effect, appointed from ‘functional constituencies’ (see:< 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_Council_of_Hong_Kong>). In both cases 
‘citizen voters’ are not necessarily natural persons.  However, these tend to be 
marginal cases, ones either of an historical anomaly with little real power, or 
arrangements designed to deal with limited and unusual situations. 
.  
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